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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

ATLANTIC RICHFIELD COMPANY,
a Corporation,
Plaintiff,
-vSTATE TAX COMMISSION
OF UTAH,

Case No.
12823

Defendant.

BRIEF' O·F DEFENDANT.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This proceeding is upon Writ of Review to review a
decision of the Utah State Tax Commission, (hereinafter sometimes referred to as "the Commission" or "the Tax Commission"), under date of January 7, 1972, wherein said Commission assessed a motor fuel tax against plaintiff for motor fuel
received and exchanged within the State of Utah (i.e., imported into the State and subsequently exported therefrom) during the period of January 1, 1968, through December 21, 1969,
a period of twenty-four consecutive months (R. 2, 3, 14).
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DISPOSITION BEFORE THE
UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION
The Tax Commission, on January 7, 1972, issued an
order assessing a motor fuel excise tax against taxpayer and
ordered the same to be paid, which assessment totalled the sum
of $75,376.59, together with interest in the amount of
$5,252.91 (R. 5, 8, 9).
RELIEF SOUGHT ON REVIEW
Defendant seeks an order of the Court affirming the decision and order of the Tax Commission in the tax assessment
made by said Commission against plaintiff. Plaintiff seeks
an order vacating said decision and assessment.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The parties to this action have entered into a stipulation
of facts ( R. 14-18) , and these facts are incorporated into and
restated in the decision of the Commission ( R. 1-6) , and in
plaintiff's Brief; however, it appears appropriate at this point
to emphasize certain additional facts not stressed in plaintiff's
Brief.
Plaintiff's Brief fails to indicate that the tax levied and
imposed by the Commission is to be levied and imposed, pursuant to Section 41-11-6, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, upon the
sale or use of all motor fuels sold, used or received for sale or
use in this State (unless specifically exempted), and that an
exemption from such tax may be allowed when such "imported" fuel is subsequently "exported" outside the State. With
this minor exception, defendant agrees with the statement of
facts as submitted in plaintiff's Brief.
2

ARGUMENT
POINT

I

ASSUMING THAT THE STATUTE REGARDING THE SUBJECT EXEMPTION IS UNCLEAR,
THE GENERAL RULE IS THAT INASMUCH AS
EXEMPTIONS ARE NOT FAVORED, GRANTS
OF EXEMPTION ARE TO BE STRICTLY CONSTRUED IN FAVOR OF THE STATE.
There is no dispute in the present action as to the statutory
legality of the excise tax as it refers to motor fuels received for
sale or use in the State; nor is there dispute as to the Tax Commission's authority to establish such rules and regulations as
may be necessary to administer the subject tax law. It is felt,
however, that the following references may be of benefit to
the Court in its consideration of the herein matter.
Utah Code Annotated, Section 41-11-7 (1953), requires
that:
"Every distributor of motor fuel shall render to
the state tax commission . . . on forms prescribed,
prepared and furnished by it, a statement . . . of the
number of gallons of motor fuel sold, used or received
for sale or use by (the distributor)."
Utah Code Annotated, Section 4-11-6 (1953), requires
that a tax be levied and imposed by the Commission on each
gallon of motor fuel sold, used or received for sale or use by
a distributor within the State of Utah unless such motor fuel
is specifically exempted.
Section 41-11-16 of Utah Code Annotated (1953),
states that:

3

"The state tax commission may make and promulgate such r~a~ona~le rules and regulations pertaining
to the admm1strat1on and enforcement of this act as
the commission deems necessary."
Further, there is no dispute as to whether or not the
motor fuels in question fall within the taxing powers of the
Commission unless exempt. The thrust of the dispute in the
present case arises out of the Commission's application of the
statutes and regulations involved, {specifically Section 41-1120, Utah Code Annotated ( 1953), and Motor Fuels Tax Regulation No. 3}, as well as certain other rules and regulations
adopted and utilized by the Tax Commission in its administration of the Motor Fuels Tax Act.
It is to be noted that the tax imposed in the present case
is levied and imposed pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, Section 41-11-6 (1953). That statute states, in part:
"There is hereby levied and imposed a tax .
upon the sale or use of all motor fuels sold, used or
received for sale or use in this state, . " (Emphasis
added.)
Section 41-11-2(2), Utah Code Annotated (1953), deems
motor fuels imported by any person into the State from any
other state to be received ". . . at the time when and the place
where the interstate transportation of such motor fuel shall
have been completed within the State . . . ." There is no
question as to the fact that the subject motor fuels were "received" in the State of Utah and, subsequently, exported (R.
2, 14); nor is there any question as to plaintiff's failure to report the receipt of such fuels as required by Utah Code Annotated, Section 41-11-7 (1953) (R. 2, 14, 15).
4

Utah Code Annotated, Section 41-11-6 (195 3), makes
it clear that the tax is levied and imposed when the motor fuels
are received into the State, and that such tax is to be imposed
on all such motor fuels. No motor fuels, including "exported"
motor fuels, are automatically exempt from such taxation. For
such an exemption, an application must be made within 180
days after exportation. With particular reference to Section
41-11-20, Utah Code Annotated (1953), wherein export sales
are exempted, one claiming an exemption, must furnish proof
of actual exportation upon blanks furnished by the Tax Commission. That same statute further states:
" . . . and in accordance with the rules and regulations promulgated by it, (the Commission) the state
tax commission shall, as the case may be, either collect
no tax or refund the amount of tax paid to the person
who paid it on his application made within 180 days
after exportation . . . . " (Emphasis added.)

Plaintiff states that the statute referenced immediately above
is unclear as to whether or not the 180-day limitation applies
to the collection of the tax and the refund or just to the refund
provision alone.
The rules and regulations as published by the Commission attempt to clarify the situation. Defendant's Motor Fuels
Tax Regulation No. 3 states:
"In all cases, claims for credit or refund must be
made within 180 days from date of export . . . ."
(Emphasis added.)

Defendant respectfully submits that the word "credit" does
not mean "collect no tax'', nor does it mean "refund" or "exemption". [Cf. Kupper v. Fiscal Courts of Jefferson County,
5

346 S.W. 2d 766, 767 (1961), wherein the Kentucky Court
stated that an "exemption" completely absolved a potential taxpayer from any liability for tax whatsoever, while "credit" relieved the taxpayer from direct payment of all or a portion of
a particular tax on the theory that it had been satisfied by some
other method.} The Commission could allow no exemption
inasmuch as application was not timely made, nor could it
allow a "credit" as the tax had not been satisfied by paymen~
or other method. It most certainly could not be assumed that
the Commission did not intend to ever collect a tax on fuels
received into the State pursuant to the statute. The Commission submits that the statute and the rule are not so unclear
as to cause confusion relative to a distributor's obligation to
pay a tax thereunder. What the Tax Commission attempts in
this case is to collect a properly levied and imposed tax on an
unreported and unaccounted for imported fuel (not an "exempt" fuel) and has decided not to allow an exemption, or
credit (since the tax has not been satisfied by other methods) ,
because of plaintiff's failure to apply for such within the 180day limitation.
In any event, even if we were to assume an ambiguity
exists in the "exemption" statute {Utah Code Annotated, Section 41-11-20 ( 1953)} and in Regulation No. 3, while as a
general rule, ambiguities in general taxing statutes result in
construction of such statute in favor of the taxpayer and against
the taxing entity (see 5 1 Am. Jur., Taxation, § 316) , statutes

relating to exemptions are to be construed strictly in favor of
the State and against the one seeking exemption.

"Since taxation is the rule and exemption is the
exception, and since exemptions from taxation are ?-ot
favored, the general rule is that a grant of exemption
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from taxation is never presumed." ( 84 C.J.S., Taxation, § 225)
"{SJ ince . . . exemptions from taxation are not
favored, an alleged . . . statutory grant of exemption
will be strictly construed in favor of the state and taxation and against the taxpayer and exemption, and
in following this rule of strict construction all
doubts will be resolved against the claimed exemption.
Such a privilege or immunity cannot be made out by
inference or implication, but must be conferred in terms
too clear and plain to be mistaken, and in fact admitting of no reasonable doubt, and where it exists it
should be carefully scrutinized and not permitted to
extend either in scope or duration beyond what the
terms of the concession clearly require or allow, or so
as to create an absolute and irrevocable exemption unless the language of the statute clearly so requires."
(Ibid at § 227)
Defendant submits that the general rules set forth above
apply to the instant case, and that the allowance of exemption
in this matter would be the result of inference or implication
[assuming that Utah Code Annotated, Section 41-11-20
( 19 5 3 ) , is not clear as to its application} and would extend
the privilege beyond what the concession clearly allows.
POINT

II

DEFENDANT'S CONDITIONS FOR OBTAINING AN EXEMPTION ARE NOT UNREASONABLE, AND PLAINTIFF'S FAILURE TO COMPLY THEREWITH IS SUFFICIENT GROUND
FOR THE COMMISSION TO DENY SUCH EXEMPTION.

In McClure v. City of Texarkana, 435 S.W. 2d 599 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1968), a statute provided an exemption from prop7

erty tax and property used for public colleges and public academies. The statute stated, in part:
" . . . provided, however, that said schools .. .
desiring the right of exemption of the properties .. .
shall first prepare and file with the tax assessor . . . a
complete itemized statement of all said property . . . ."
(See Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Art. 7150, Par. 1 ( 1960) ).
In that case, the appellant had property which was used for
school purposes, but she had failed to file the proper statement with the assessor. In holding that the appellant was not
now entitled to the exemption, the Court said:

"Because exemption from taxation is not favored,
the person or institution claiming an exemption must
satisfy in detail all the substantive requirements of the
law that grants it." ( 435 S.W. 2d at 601, and cases
therein cited.)
In the California case of First Unitarian Church of Los
Angeles v. County of Los Angeles, 48 C 2d 419, 311 P.2d
508 (1957), the California Supreme Court, in holding that a
State Constitution section making nonadvocacy of an over·
throw of government by unlawful means a condition to tax
exemption was not repugnant to the Federal Constitution,

stated:
"{A}n exemption from taxation is the exception
and the unusual. . . . It may be granted with or withont (sic) conditions but where reasonable conditions
are imposed they must be complied with." 311 P.2d at
512.
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Plaintiff attempts to weaken defendant's position by setting forth in its Brief comment relative to the failure of Regulation No. 3 to refer to Form TC-110 D-1. Plaintiff admits that
licensed distributors must report on Form TC-11 O D-1 that
information which is relative to exported fuels. Regulation
No. 3 admittedly refers only to TC-112, and, in fact, applies
only to unlicensed distributors. In practice and application, the
Form TC-112 is submitted by an unlicensed distributor through
a licensed distributor. The licensed distributor must then make
a report to the Commission relative to exported fuels on a
Form TC-110 D-1. (See Motor Fuels Tax, Regulation No. 3,
paragraph No. 4, as cited R. 4, 16). The Form TC-112 is
not submitted to the Commission but is retained in the licensed
distributors' files in support of the exportation of fuels via an
unlicensed distributor. Plaintiff makes no claim as to its lack
of awareness of the regulations as used and applied by the
Commission. The forms "prescribed, prepared and furnished"
by the Commission are explanatory as to the procedure to be
used in situations such as the instant case. (Cf. Utah Code
Annotated, Section 41-11-7 (1953) ).
Defendant contends that the rules and regulations as
applied by the Commission are reasonable conditions and must
be complied with in an attempt to obtain exemption. Plaintiff's
failure to satisfy in detail all of the substantive requirements
of the law granting such exemption results in its ineligibility
for same.
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POINT

III

TO ALLOW PLAINTIFF'S INTERPRETATION
OF UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, SECTION 4111-20 (1953), WOULD REQUIRE THAT THE
LAW GIVE PREFERENCE TO PERSONS FAILING TO PROPERLY REPORT IMPORTED
MOTOR FUELS.
As has been set forth above, the Utah State Legislature
has required that a tax be levied and imposed on all motor fuels
sold or used or received for sale or use in the State. The motor
fuels in question here were indeed received in the State for
"sale" or "use" ( R. 2, 14, 15). As above set forth and pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, Section 41-11-7 (1953), every
distributor delivering motor fuel within the State must make
written report of all such deliveries to the State Tax Commission. To allow plaintiff to prevail in its argument that the 180day limitation of Section 41-11-20, Utah Code Annotated
(195 3) applies only to claims for refund as opposed to the
ability of the Commission to collect the tax would give preference to those distributors failing to initially report fuels received by them for sale or use as against those who properly
file such report. (i.e., one who properly filed a report of re·
ceipt of fuel would lose his 180-day exemption if he failed to
apply for same within the prescribed time; whereas, one who
failed to make the proper initial report would not lose an
exemption as there would be no recorded "receipt" of motor
fuels on which to levy and impose a tax, and no time would
run against such.
Further, if the practice of Atlantic-Richfield of not reporting the sale were allowed, the Tax Commission would be
10

deprived of the information it needs to properly administer the
act. Evidence of the Legislature's intent to provide the Tax
Commission with reports on all fuel received is the fact that
until 1933, the statute simply said: "Said excise tax shall not
be imposed on motor fuel when sold for export from this
State." {Revised Statutes of Utah, § 57-12-15 (1953)}. In
1933, the Legislature amended the statute to provide for the
proof of actual exportation on application within sixty days.
(19 3 3 Utah Laws, Ch. 41, § 1 ) . The Code has since been
amended to allow exporters to claim their exemption by furnishing the Tax Commission with proof of actual exportation
and an application within the 180-day period. To permit a
longer period of time would create a hardship on the Commission, insofar as auditing of records and examination thereof is
concerned in attempting to obtain proof of "export sales". A
shorter period of time would perhaps not allow the taxpayer
a reasonable period in which to offer his proof of export sales.
POINT

IV

THE DEOSION OF THE TAX COMMISSION IS
NOT CLEARLY ERRONEOUS, NOR WAS IT
BASED ON PROCEDURAL IRREGULARITIES
SUFFICIENT TO ALLOW IT TO BE DISTURBED BY THE COURT.
The Utah case of McKendrick v. State Tax Commission,
9 Utah 2d 418, 347 P.2d 177, (1959), while dealing with a
proceeding for review of a decision of the Tax Commission
assessing a deficiency for state sales tax on a taxpayer's sale of
artificial limbs, did set forth this Court's feelings with regard
to the latitude necessary to be granted to the Commission in
the performance of its duties and to the hesitancy of the Court
11

--to disturb decisions made by the Commission. The Court
therein said, in part:
"{NJ otwithstanding the fact the statute providing for review by this court of decisions of the tax
commission allows it to be made 'both upon the law
and the facts', we nevertheless allow considerable latitude to the determination made by the Tax Commission and do not disturb it unless it is clearly erroneous."
(347 P.2d at 178 and cases therein cited.)
There has been no claim made of actual irregularity by
the Commission in the performance of its duties with respect
to the matter at hand. However, plaintiff would make it appear in its Brief that the application of Commission rules is
inconsistent and irregular. Defendant submits that there is no
ground or evidence upon which to make this determination
and, in fact, states that plaintiff is treated equally with all
other persons or entities in the same situation. However, even
if we were to assume certain irregularities were to take place,
such is generally not sufficient to warrant a relief from a tax
obligation. 84 C.J.S. Taxation §720 makes this point clear
in commenting:
"In the absence of statutory prohibition, a court
of equity may enjoin the collection of a tax which is
entirely illegal or levied without any authority, and
which, therefore, in justice and good conscience, the
citizen should not be compelled to pay; but such relief
will not be granted because of mere errors or irregularities in the proceedings not affecting the substantial
justice of the tax, or because of technical objections or
circumstances of hardship in the particular case which
do not undermine the foundations of complainant's
obligations to pay his tax, or where the relief will end
in injustice." (Emphasis added.)
12
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CONCLUSION
Even if we are to asswne that the Motor Fuels Tax Act
and the Motor Fuels Tax Regulation No. 3, as they relate to
exemptions, are unclear, and inasmuch as the Commission's
conditions for obtaining an exemption are not unreasonable,
nor was the Commission's decision below clearly erroneous or
based on substantial procedural irregularities, and in light of
the fact that to allow an exemption in the instant matter
would be to favor those who fail to comply with the Commission's rules and regulations and prejudice those who do
comply, and in the further light that exemptions are not favored and grants of same are to be strictly construed in favor
of the State, it is respectfully requested that the decision of
the Tax Commission be upheld, and that plaintiff be ordered
to pay to the Commission the amount of the tax assessed.
Respectfully submitted,
VERNON B. ROMNEY
Attorney General
G. BLAINE DAVIS
Assistant Attorney General
GREGORY D. FARLEY
Assistant Attorney General
236 State Capitol Bldg.
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114

Attorneys for Defendant
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